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Abstract
Preferences of a set of n individuals over a set of alternatives can be repre-
sented by a preference prole being an n-tuple of preference relations over these
alternatives. A social choice correspondence assigns to every preference prole a
subset of alternatives that can be viewed as the `most prefered' alternatives by
the society consisting of all individuals.
Two new social choice correspondences are introduced and analyzed. Both
are Pareto optimal and are renements of the well known Top cycle correspon-
dence in case the corresponding simple majority win digraph is a tournament.
One of them even is such a renement for arbitrary preference proles.
JEL classication: D71
Keywords: Social choice, Condorcet social choice correspondence, Top cycle,
Pareto optimality, -social choice correspondence, -social choice correspon-
dence.
1 Introduction
Preferences of an individual i over a set of alternatives A can be represented by a
preference relation pi on A. We denote xpiy if individual i prefers alternative x to
alternative y. For a society consisting of a nite number of n agents a preference prole
p is an n-tuple of such preference relations, each one representing the preferences of
one individual. We refer to a triple (N;A; p) as above as a social choice situation.
Although it is straightforward to nd the most prefered alternative(s) in an individual
preference relation that is complete and transitive, this is not the case for a preference
prole which consists of n such individual preference relations. In the literature various
social choice correspondences are dened which assign to every social choice situation
a subset of alternatives which can be viewed as the `most prefered' alternatives by the
society consisting of all individuals. Examples of social choice correspondences can be
found in, e.g., Schwartz (1972, 1990), Slater (1961), Fishburn (1977), Miller (1980),
Banks (1985), Moulin (1986), Dutta (1988) and Laond, Laslier and LeBreton (1993,
1995).
For a social choice situation (N;A; p) the corresponding simple majority win
digraph is the binary relation Dp  A  A, where the arc (x; y) belongs to Dp if
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alternative x `defeats' alternative y by simple majority vote. So, alternative x defeats
alternative y if and only if the number of individuals that (strictly) prefer x to y in their
individual preference relation exceeds the number of individuals that (strictly) prefer
y to x. A social choice correspondence is called majoritarian if it only depends on
the corresponding simple majority win digraphs. In this paper we introduce two new
majoritarian social choice correspondences which are dened using two relational power
measures. Applied to social choice situations, a relational power measure is a function
that assigns to every alternative in a simple majority win digraph a real number. These
numbers induce an absolute ranking over the alternatives. Given a relational power
measure one can dene a social choice correspondence as the correspondence that
assigns to a social choice situation the set of alternatives with highest power measure
in the corresponding simple majority win digraph.
We use the relational power measures  and  as introduced, respectively, in
van den Brink and Borm (1995) and Borm, van den Brink and Slikker (2000), to derive
two new social choice correspondences. These two new social choice correspondences,
the - and -social choice correspondence, turn out to perform well. Both are Pareto
optimal and, in case the simple majority win digraph is a tournament, are renements
of Schwartz's Top cycle correspondence. The -social choice correspondence even is
such a renement of for arbitrary social choice situations. On the other hand, the
-social choice correspondence is monotone.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some preliminaries
on social choice correspondences. In Section 3 we dene the -measure and give an
axiomatic characterization. Section 4 discusses the corresponding -social choice corre-
spondence on the basis of elementary properties. In Section 5 we dene the -measure
and characterize it for strongly connected digraphs by means of determinants of special
matrices. Section 6 discusses the corresponding -social choice corespondence. Finally,
Section 7 gives some examples.
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2 Preliminaries
In this paper we assume that individual preferences over a non-empty nite set of
alternatives A can be represented by weak orders, i.e., preference relations pi that are
complete1 and transitive2. A preference prole of a nite set of N of individuals N
over a set of alternatives A is a tuple p = (pi)i2N of individual preference relations on
A. A linear order is a weak order that is asymmetric3. If all orders are linear we call
the prole a linear preference prole. A triple (N;A; p) is a social choice situation. It
is called linear if p is linear. The class of all social choice situations is denoted by S.
A social choice correspondence C on S  S assigns to each (N;A; p) 2 S a
non-empty subset C(N;A; p) of A. The alternatives in the subset C(N;A; p) can be
seen as the most prefered ones by the society consisting of all individuals. Given social
choice situation (N;A; p) the simple majority win digraph Dp with Dp  A  A is
dened as follows:
(x; y) 2 Dp , np(x; y) > np(y; x);
where np(x; y) = jfi 2 N j xpiy and :ypixgj is the number of individuals that (strictly)
prefer x to y in the prole p. Clearly, Dp is asymmetric
4. If, e.g., the number of indi-
viduals is odd and all individual preferences are linear orders then Dp is a tournament
5.
Given a social choice correspondence C on S and a social choice situation (N;A; p) 2 S
we call C(N;A; p) the corresponding social choice set . A standard requirement for a
social choice correspondence is that it satises the Condorcet principle. A Condorcet
winner in (N;A; p) is an alternative x 2 A such that (x; y) 2 Dp for all y 2 A n fxg.
The Condorcet principle states that a social choice correspondence on S  S should
1A preference relation pi on A is complete if for every pair of distinct alternatives x; y 2 A at least
one of the following is true: xpiy or ypix.
2A preference relation pi on A is transitive if for every triple of alternatives x; y; z 2 A, xpiy and
ypiz implies that xpiz.
3A preference relation pi on A is asymmetric if for every pair of alternatives x; y 2 A, xpiy implies
that :ypix.
4Note that Dp also denes a preference relation. To make clear the distinction between individual
preference relations and simple majority win digraphs we use dierent terminology for these. Deni-
tions of completeness, transitivity and asymmetry given before for preference relations can be stated
for digraphs in a straightforward way.
5A digraph (A;D) is a tournament if it is complete and asymmetric.
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choose the Condorcet winner in any social choice situation in S which has a Con-
dorcet winner. A social choice correspondence that satises the Condorcet principle is
called a Condorcet social choice correspondence. A social choice correspondence on S
is called majoritarian if the social choice set assigned to each social choice situation
(N;A; p) 2 S only depends on the simple majority win digraph Dp.
The simple majority win digraph Dp does not represent the preferences of an
individual but summarizes the preferences of all individuals into one preference relation
that can be seen as reecting the preferences of society. Note that even if the individual
preference relations are linear, the relation Dp need not be a weak order. Consider, for
example, the linear social choice situation (N;A; p) with N = f1; 2; 3g, A = fx; y; zg
and linear preference prole p1 : (x; y; z), p2 : (y; z; x) and p3 : (z; x; y).
Three famous majoritarian Condorcet social choice correspondences are the fol-
lowing. The Copeland correspondence COP is given by
COP (N;A; p) = fx 2 A j cx(Dp)  cy(Dp) for all y 2 Ag;
where cx(D) = jfy 2 A j (x; y) 2 Dgj   jfy 2 A j (y; x) 2 Dgj is the Copeland
score of alternative x in digraph (A;D). So, the Copeland score of an alternative in a
simple majority win digraph is the dierence between the number of alternatives that
it defeats and the number of alternatives by which it is defeated. The social choice set
according to the Copeland correspondence consists of the alternatives with the highest
Copeland score in the corresponding simple majority win digraph6.
Let (A;Dp) be the transitive closure of digraph Dp, i.e., (x; y) 2 Dp if and
only if there exist x1; : : : ; xt 2 A such that (i) x1 = x, (ii) (xk; xk+1) 2 Dp for all
k 2 f1; : : : ; t  1g, and (iii) xt = y. A subset T  A is a Top cycle in Dp if
(i) x; y 2 T; x 6= y) (x; y) 2 Dp, and
(ii) x 62 T; y 2 T ) (x; y) 62 Dp.
Schwartz'sTop cycle correspondence TOP assigns to every social choice situation (N;A; p)
the union of all Top cycles in Dp. Note that if the simple majority win digraph Dp is
6The Copeland score has been used in ranking alternatives in digraphs in, e.g., Rubinstein (1980)
and Henriet (1985).
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a tournament on A then it has exactly one Top cycle7.
An alternative y is covered by x in a social choice situation (N;A; p) if
(i) (y; z) 2 Dp ) (x; z) 2 Dp for all z 2 A, and
(ii) (x; y) 2 Dp.
The uncovered set correspondence UNC assigns to every social choice situation (N;A; p)
the set of alternatives that are not covered by some other alternative in (N;A; p).
In this paper we only consider domains S  S that are comprehensive, i.e., (N;A; p) 2
S; N 0  N and A0  A implies that (N 0; A; p jN 0) 2 S and (N;A
0; p jA0) 2 S, where
p jN 0 and p jA0 denote the restriction of p to N
0 and A0, respectively. Next we recall
some elementary properties of a social choice correspondence C on a comprehensive
domain S  S.
 Homogeneity: If (N;A; p); (M;A; q) 2 S are such that there is a k 2 IN with
jfj 2M j qj = pigj = k for all i 2 N , then C(N;A; p) = C(M;a; q);
 Monotonicity: If (N;A; p); (N;A; q) 2 S and x 2 A are such that for every
i 2 N it holds that
(i) ypiz , yqiz for all y; z 2 A n fxg; y 6= z,
(ii) xpiy) xqiy for all y 2 A n fxg, and
(iii) x 2 C(N;A; p),
then x 2 C(N;A; q);
 Pareto optimality: If (N;A; p) 2 S and x; y 2 A are such that
(i) ypix for all i 2 N , and
(ii) there is an i 2 N such that :xpiy,
7Suppose there are two dierent Top cycles, T and T 0, in the tournament Dp. For every x 2
T; y 2 T 0 it then holds that either (x; y) 2 Dp  Dp in which case T
0 cannot be a Top cycle, or
(y; x) 2 Dp  Dp in which case T cannot be a Top cycle.
6
then x 62 C(N;A; p).
 Smith's Condorcet principle: If for every (N;A; p) 2 S such that A can be
partioned into nonempty subsets A1 and A2 with (x; y) 2 Dp for all x 2 A1; y 2
A2, it holds that A2 \ C(N;A; p) = ;;
 Condorcet transitivity: If (N;A; p) 2 S, y 2 C(N;A; p) and (x; y) 2 Dp then
x 2 C(N;A; p);
 Subset condition 1: For every (N;A; p) 2 S with jAj  2 and x 2 C(N;A; p),
there exists an y 2 A n fxg such that x 2 C(N;A n fyg; p jAnfyg);
 Subset condition 2: For every (N;A; p) 2 S with jAj  2 and x 2 C(N;A; p),
there exists an y 2 A n fxg such that x 2 C(N; fx; yg; p jfx;yg).
For a discussion on these properties we refer to Fishburn (1977). A well known result
that is used in this paper is that all majoritarian social choice correspondences satisfy
homogeneity. Above we showed how every social choice situation (N;A; p) leads to a
simple majority win digraph Dp. The next proposition shows that for every asymmetric
digraph (A;D) one can construct a social choice situation such that (A;D) is the
corresponding simple majority win digraph8.
Proposition 2.1 For every asymmetric digraph (A;D) there is a social choice situa-
tion (N;A; p) such that D = Dp.
Proof
Let A = fx1; : : : ; xng. For every (xi; xj) 2 D with i < j consider the social choice
situation (N;A; p) with N = f1; 2g, A = fx1; : : : ; xng, and preference prole p given
by
p1 : x1; : : : xi 1; xi+1; : : : ; xj 1; xj+1; : : : ; xn; xi; xj
p2 : xi; xj; xn; : : : xj+1; xj 1; : : : ; xi+1; xi 1; : : : ; x1
Naturally, if i > j one can construct a similar prole. The simple majority win digraph
of this prole is given by Dp = f(xi; xj)g. Combining these jDj preference proles
8In McGarvey (1953) this is shown for tournaments.
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We denote the set of all digraphs on A by DA. A relational power measure on a
set A of alternatives is a function f :DA ! IRA that assigns an jAj-dimensional real
vector f(D) 2 IRA to every digraph D on A. Applying a relational power measure
to simple majority win digraphs corresponding to a social choice situations in some
domain S within S, we can dene the corresponding social choice correspondence as the
correspondence that assigns to every social choice situation in S the set of alternatives
with highest measure. An example of a relational power measure is the Copeland score,
which has the Copeland correspondence as corresponding social choice correspondence.
In this section and Section 5 we discuss two other relational power measures. Sections
4 and 6 discuss the corresponding social choice correspondences.
For a digraph D and an alternative x 2 A, the alternatives in SD(x) = fy 2 A j
(x; y) 2 Dg are called the successors of x in D, and the alternatives in PD(x) = fy 2
A j (y; x) 2 Dg are called the predecessors of x in D. Assume that each alternative has







for all x 2 A: (1)
Thus, the -measure distributes the initial weight of each alternative in a digraph
equally over itself and all its predecessors9. Dening for every D 2 DA the transition






if (x; y) 2 D or x = y
0 otherwise,
9We remark that this is not the `original' -measure considered in van den Brink and Gilles (1992),
but the modied version considered in van den Brink and Borm (1994) who also provide a game
theoretic analysis of the -measure.
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it readily follows that (D) = (D)1 A, where 1 A is the jAj-dimensional vector which
elements are all equal to one.
Example 3.1 Consider the (tournament) digraph D on A = fx; y; z; wg given by


















The Copeland score of this digraph is given by c(D) = (1; 1; 1; 1). According to
the Copeland score alternatives x and y are ranked equally and are ranked higher than
alternatives z and w (which are both ranked equal). However, the -measure of this








). According to this -measure alternative x is
ranked higher than alternative y. 2
Next we characterize the -measure as a relational power measure for digraphs. Al-
ternatives x; y 2 A are connected in digraph D if there is a sequence of alterna-
tives (x1; : : : ; xm) such that (i) x1 = x, (ii) f(xk; xk+1); (xk+1; xk)g \ D 6= ; for all
k 2 f1; : : : ;m   1g, and (iii) xm = y. A subset of alternatives T  A is a maximally
connected subset in a digraph D if (i) every pair of alternatives x; y 2 T is connected
in D, and (ii) no x 2 T and y 2 A n T are connected in D.
A relational power measure is component ecient if the sum of the power mea-
sures assigned to all alternatives in a maximally connected subset of alternatives is
equal to the number of alternatives in that maximally connected subset.
Axiom 3.2 (Component eciency) For every D 2 DA and every maximally con-
nected subset T of alternatives in D it holds that
P
x2T fx(D) = jT j.
Consider a digraph D 2 DA and two alternatives x; z 2 A that both are predecessors
of an alternative y 2 A. The second axiom states that deleting the arc between x and
9
y has the same eect on the power measure of x as deleting the arc between z and y
has on the power measure of z.
Axiom 3.3 (Equal loss property) For every D 2 DA, y 2 A and x; z 2 PD(y),
fx(D)   fx(D n f(x; y)g) = fz(D)   fz(D n f(z; y)g).
The third axiom states that the power measures of the alternatives are `locally' deter-
mined in the sense that the measure of alternative x does not change if the relation
only changes `far away' from x as described in the following axiom.
Axiom 3.4 (Local determinateness) For every D 2 DA, x; y 2 A satisfying y 62
(SD(x) [ fxg), and z 2 PD(y), fx(D) = fx(D n f(z; y)g).
We refer to the dierence fx(D)  fx(D n f(z; y)g) as the marginal dierence of x with
respect to (z; y) in D. The fourth axiom states that for every alternative y that is
defeated in D the sum of the marginal dierences of all predecessors of y with respect
to their arc with y minus the sum of marginal dierences of y with respect to its arcs
with all its predecessors equals one.




[(fx(D)   fx(D n f(x; y)g))  (fy(D)   fy(D n f(x; y)g))] = 1 :
Thus the `shift in power' resulting from one by one deleting the arcs on which one
particular alternative is defeated equals the total power over that alternative. The four
axioms stated above uniquely determine the -measure as a relational power measure.
Proposition 3.6 The -measure is the unique relational power measure f :DA ! IRA
that satises component eciency, the equal loss property, local determinateness and
the marginal dierence property.
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Proof
It is easy to verify that  satises component eciency and local determinateness.
Let D 2 DA, y 2 A and x; z 2 PD(y). Then




showing that  satises the equal loss property.
Now, let D 2 DA and y 2 A be such that PD(y) 6= ;. Then
X
x2PD(y)




















showing that  satises the marginal dierence property.
In order to prove the theorem it remains to show that f(D) is uniquely determined if
f :DA ! IRA satises the four axioms. Therefore, suppose that f :DA ! IRA satises
the four axioms. Let D 2 DA. We proceed by induction on the number jDj of elements
in D.
If jDj = 0 then D = ;, and component eciency implies that fx(D) = 1 for all x 2 A.
Proceeding by induction, assume that f(D0) is uniquely determined for all digraphs
D0 2 DA with jD0j  k  1, and let D 2 DA with jDj = k  1. Further, let y 2 A with
PD(y) 6= ;, and take z 2 PD(y).
For every x 2 A n (PD(y) [ fyg) local determinateness and the induction hypothesis
imply that the values
fx(D) = fx(D n f(z; y)g) (2)
are uniquely determined. For every x 2 PD(y) n fzg the equal loss property implies
that
fx(D)  fx(D n f(x; y)g) = fz(D)   fz(D n f(z; y)g):
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With the induction hypothesis it follows that the values
fx(D)  fz(D) = fx(D n f(x; y)g)  fz(D n f(z; y)g) (3)
are uniquely determined for all x 2 PD(y)nfzg. This yields jPD(y)j 1 linear equations.
The marginal dierence property and the induction hypothesis imply that
X
x2PD(y)
(fx(D)   fy(D)) = 1 +
X
x2PD(y)
(fx(D n f(x; y)g)  fy(D n f(x; y)g)): (4)
Finally, component eciency10 and equation (2) yield
X
x2PD(y)[fyg
fx(D) = jAj  
X
x2An(PD(y)[fyg)
fx(D n f(z; y)g): (5)
Deriving from equations (3), (4) and (5) the corresponding (jPD(y)j+1)(jPD(y)j+1)
matrix given by 11
0
BBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 : : : 0  1 0







0 0 : : : 1  1 0
1 1 : : : 1 1  jPD(y)j




we can determine that the determinant of this matrix is not equal to zero. So, the
equations (3), (4) and (5) yield jPD(y)j + 1 linearly independent equations in the
jPD(y)j + 1 unknown variables fx(D); x 2 PD(y) [ fyg, and thus these variables are
uniquely determined. Uniqueness of f(D) then follows with (2).
2
10Note that component eciency implies eciency stating that
P
x2A fx(D) = jAj for all digraphs
D 2 DA.
11The rst jPD(y)j   1 rows follow from (3), the jPD(y)j   th row from (4), and the last row from
(5). The rst jPD(y)j   1 columns correspond to the alternatives x 2 PD(y) n fzg, the jPD(y)j   th
column to z, and the last column to y.
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We remark that the independence of the axioms stated in Theorem 3.6 can be illus-
trated by presenting four alternative relational power measures that each satisfy three
but not all four of the axioms12.
We end this section by remarking that two alternative characterizations of  are
obtained by replacing component eciency and the equal loss property in Theorem 3.6
by eciency and symmetry13, or by replacing component eciency in Theorem 3.6 by
eciency and symmetry for D;. Note that the second alternative characterization uses
weaker axioms than the ones in Theorem 3.6 in the sense that component eciency
implies eciency and symmetry for D;, but not the other way around.
4 The -social choice correspondence
In this section we apply the -measure to dene the majoritarian social choice corre-
spondence C given by
C(N;A; p) = fx 2 A j x(Dp)  y(Dp) for all y 2 Ag:
We verify some elementary properties.
Theorem 4.1 The social choice correspondence C is a Condorcet social choice corre-
spondence which satises homogeneity, monotonicity, Pareto optimality, Smith's Con-
dorcet principle and Subset condition 2.
Proof
If x is the Condorcet winner in social choice situation (N;A; p) then (SDp(y) [ fyg) 












Thus, C(N;A; p) = fxg, showing that C is a Condorcet social choice correspondence.
12These alternative measures can be obtained from the authors on request.
13A relational power measure f :DA ! IRA satises symmetry if for every D 2 DA and x; y 2 D
with SD(x) = SD(y) and PD(x) = PD(y), fx(D) = fy(D). It satises symmetry for D; if this is only
required for D; = ;.
13
Homogeneity follows by C being a majoritarian social choice correspondence.
To see that C is monotonic we consider social choice situations (N;A; p); (N;A; q)
such that there exists an x 2 A with, for every i 2 N , (i) ypiz , yqiz for all y; z 2
A n fxg; y 6= z, and (ii) xpiy ) xqiy for all y 2 A n fxg. We establish the following
facts:
(a) PDq (y)  PDp(y) for all y 2 A n fxg,
(b) SDq (y)  SDp(y) for all y 2 A n fxg,
(c) PDq (x)  PDp(x), and
(d) SDq (x)  SDp(x).















































































































The rst inequality follows from fact (a), the second inequality follows from facts (b)
and (c), the third inequality follows from fact (c), the fourth inequality follows again
from fact (a), and the rst equality after the inequalities follows from fact (d).
Therefore x cannot prot less than any other alternative from replacing p with q,
implying that C is monotonic.
To show Pareto optimality of C we take alternatives y; x 2 A such that ypix for all
i 2 N and there exists an i 2 N such that :xpiy. Then (y; x) 2 Dp. Because the
individual preferences are transitive we know that (z; y) 2 Dp ) (z; x) 2 Dp; and
(x; z) 2 Dp ) (y; z) 2 Dp for all z 2 A n fx; yg. Therefore y(Dp) > x(Dp), and thus
x 62 C(N;A; p), proving Pareto optimality of C.
To show Smith's Condorcet principle, suppose that A can be partioned into nonemp-


















for all y 2 A2 ; A2 \ C(N;A; p) = ;, showing that C satises Smith's
Condorcet principle.
To show Subset condition 2, it is clear that x(Dp)  1 if x 2 C(N;A; p) since a
best alternative must have at least the average -measure. If there is no alternative
y 2 A n fxg with (x; y) 2 Dp then also there is no y 2 A n fxg with (y; x) 2 Dp, and
thus x 2 fx; yg = C(N; fx; yg; p jfx;yg) for all y 2 A n fxg. Otherwise, if there exists
at least one alternative y 2 A n fxg with (x; y) 2 Dp then x 2 C(N; fx; yg; p jfx;yg).
2
The social choice correspondence C does not satisfy all properties discussed in Section
2.
Example 4.2 Consider a social choice situation with simple majority win digraph Dp
on A = fx; y; z; wg given by Dp = f(x; z); (z;w); (w; x)g. (Existence of such a social









Here (Dp) = (1; 1; 1; 1), and thus C(N;A; p) = A. Even though y 2 C(N;A; p) it
holds that C((N;Anfxg; p jAnfxg) = fzg; C(A n fwg; p jAnfwg) = fxg, and C(N;A n










Consider a social choice situation with simple majority win digraph Dp on A =






and thus C(N;A; p) = fzg. But (x; z) 2 Dp showing that C does not satisfy Con-
dorcet transitivity14. 2
If the simple majority win digraph corresponding to a social choice situation (N;A; p)
is a tournament then the -social choice set is a subset of the Top cycle of Dp. Since we
showed that C is Pareto optimal, for social choice situations yielding simple majority
win tournaments, C is a Pareto optimal renement of TOP . For arbitrary social choice
situations C is a Pareto optimal renement of the uncovered set correspondence UNC.
Theorem 4.3 For every social choice situation (N;A; p) it holds that C(N;A; p) 
UNC(N;A; p). If Dp is a tournament, then C(N;A; p)  TOP (N;A; p).
Proof
Let (N;A; p) be a social choice situation. If x 62 UNC(N;A; p) then there is a y 2 Anfxg
















= y(Dp), implying that
14The failure of Condorcet transitivity also follows fromC satisfying Pareto optimality, since every
Pareto optimal social choice correspondence does not satisfy Condorcet transitivity.
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x 62 C(N;A; p). So, C(N;A; p)  UNC(N;A; p).
If Dp is a tournament then C(N;A; p)  TOP (N;A;P ) follows from the fact that
Dp being a tournament implies that UNC(N;A; p)  TOP (N;A; p), and the assertion
shown above.
2
As shown below, C is not a renement of Schwartz's Top cycle correspondence for
every social choice situation.
Example 4.4 Consider a social choice situation (N;A; p) with A = fx; y; z; w; vg
which simple majority win digraph is given by Dp = f(x; y); (y; z); (y;w); (y; v)g. Then
TOP (N;A; p) = fxg, while C(N;A; p) = fyg.
5 The -measure
In this section we discuss an alternative relational power measure that can be used in
dening a social choice correspondence. In the -measure discussed in the previous
sections it is implicitly assumed that every alternative in a digraph has an initial
weight equal to one, and measuring relational power is seen as fairly redistributing
these weights according to the arcs in the digraph. Instead of taking initial weights
equal to one, it seems natural to take weights that already reect the preference of
society over the alternatives. If the measure 1 =  determines the weights in the
redistribution method discussed in Section 3, then one obtains the second order measure
2. Of course, this second order measure can be used as new input weights, and so on,








for all x 2 A and t 2 f2; 3; : : :g:
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Van den Brink, Borm, and Slikker (2000) show the existence of the limit of the iterative
process which repeats the procedure described above by considering the (k 1)th-order
-measure as new input weights at the kth step.




Example 5.2 The -measure of the digraph D given in Example 3.1 is (D) =
4
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(8; 6; 3; 6). So, the -measures of y and w are the same, while the -measure of
y exceeds that of w. 2
A digraph D is strongly connected if A is its unique Top cycle. It turns out that the
-measure of an alternative x in such a digraph is proportional to the cofactors of
the main diagonal entries of the matrix (I   (D)), I being the jAj  jAj-identity
matrix. This follows from well-known results on Markov processes. For a survey see,
e.g., Iosifescu (1980).




 (det(I  (D)) x))x2N :
6 The -social choice correspondence
Next we apply the -measure to dene the majoritarian -social choice correspondence
C given by
C(N;A; p) = fx 2 A j x(Dp)  y(Dp) for all y 2 Ag:
Compared to the properties satised by C, C satises the properties stated in Propo-
sition 4.1 except monotonicity.
Theorem 6.1 The social choice correspondence C is a Condorcet social choice corre-
spondence which satises homogeneity, Pareto optimality, Smith's Condorcet principle
and Subset condition 2.
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Proof
If x is the Condorcet winner in (N;A; p) then fxg is the unique Top cycle in Dp. Borm,
van den Brink and Slikker (2000) show that in that case x(Dp) > 0 and y(Dp) = 0
for all y 2 Anfxg. So, C(N;A; p) = fxg, showing that C is a Condorcet social choice
correspondence.
Homogeneity follows from C being majoritarian.
To show Pareto optimality of C, take alternatives x; y ; such that (i) ypix for all
i 2 N , and (ii) there is an i 2 N such that :xpiy. In that case (y; x) 2 Dp. Because
the individual preferences are transitive we know that (z; y) 2 Dp implies (z; x) 2 Dp;
and (x; z) 2 Dp implies (y; z) 2 Dp for all z 2 A n fx; yg. Since (i) xz  yz for all















So, x 62 C(N;A; p), showing that C satises Pareto optimality.
Suppose that A can be partioned into nonempty subsets A1 and A2 with (x; y) 2 Dp
for all x 2 A1; y 2 A2 : Then there is no alternative in A2 that belongs to any Top
cycle and consequently y(Dp) = 0 for all y 2 A2, implying that A2 \C(N;A; p) = ;,
showing that C satises Smith's Condorcet principle.
The validity of Subset condition 2 follows from a similar reasoning used for C in the
proof of Theorem 4.1.
2
The rst simple majority win digraphs given in Example 4.2 illustrates that C does
not satisfy Subset condition 1. Since C satises Pareto optimality, it cannot satisfy
Condorcet transitivity. One dierence with the -social choice correspondence is that
C does not satisfy monotonicity.
15Borm, van den Brink and Slikker (2000) show that for arbitrary digraphs D 2 DA, (D) is a





for all x 2 A.
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Example 6.2 Consider a social choice situation (N;A; p) with N = f1; : : : ; 8g, A =
fx; y; a1; a2; a3; a4; a5g and p given by
p1 : a1 a2 x a3 y a4 a5
p2 : a5 y a4 x a3 a1 a2
p3 : a2 x a3 y a4 a5 a1
p4 : a1 a4 a5 a3 y a2 x
p5 : x a1 a5 y a2 a3 a4
p6 : a4 a3 a2 a5 y x a1
p7 : x y a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
p8 : a5 a4 a3 a2 a1 x y
(6)















a1 x y a5
which yields C(N;A; p) = fx; yg since x(Dp) = y(Dp) =
21
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i = 1; : : : ; 5. If q is the preference prole obtained if the rst individual changes its







. Consequently x 62 C(N;A; q) : 2
Considering the properties discussed here, it seems that C is more attractive than C
for social choice situations having simple majority win tournament digraphs because of
the monotonicity of C. However,C is a (Pareto optimal) renement of Schwartz's Top
cycle correspondence for arbitrary social choice situations while C is such a renement
only if the corresponding simple majority win digraph is a tournament.
Theorem 6.3 For every social choice situation (N;A; p) it holds that C(N;A; p) 
UNC(N;A; p) and C(N;A; p)  TOP (N;A; p).
Proof
20
Let (N;A; p) be a social choice situation.
If x 62 UNC(N;A; p) then there is a y 2 A n fxg with (y; x) 2 Dp and SDp(x) 














= y(Dp), and thus x 62 C(N;A; p).
So, C(N;A; p)  UNC(N;A; p).
Borm, van den Brink and Slikker (2000) show that well-known results on stochastic
matrices as discussed in, e.g., Berger (1993) imply that x(Dp) = 0 for all x 2 N n
TOP (N;A; p), and x(Dp) > 0 for all x 2 TOP (N;A; p). But then C(N;A; p) 
TOP (N;A; p).
2
Without being precise, Fishburn (1977) also considers the `discriminability' of social
choice correspondences: `The most discriminating social choice functions [read: corre-
spondences] tend to produce choice sets that contain a single candidate; less discrim-
inating functions are inclined to produce tied candidates in which case further means
are needed to obtain unique winners'. Indeed discriminability seems to be a desir-
able property. It is clear that a social choice correspondence C that assigns to every
social choice situation a strict subset of the choice set assigned by social choice cor-
respondence C 0 is more discriminating than C 0. However, it is dicult to compare
social choice correspondences which are no renements of one another with respect to
their discriminability. Loosely speaking it is clear that the - and (more strongly) the
-social choice correspondences mostly will assign `few' alternatives to social choice
situations with simple majority tournament digraphs, and also do well with respect to
discriminability for arbitrary social choice situations.
7 Some examples
We conclude the paper by giving some examples. The rst example shows that accord-
ing to C the alternative that `defeats' the lowest number of other alternatives still can
be the unique element of the choice set.
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Example 7.1 Consider the 9-player (tournament) digraph D on A = f1; : : : ; 9g that






























































a: Subdigraph on f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g b: Subdigraph on f7; 8; 9g
Figure 1: Two subdigraphs






















Figure 2: Digraph (A;D)
This digraph represents a tournament in which the alternatives can be divided in three
groups. Group A consist of alternatives 1 through 5, group B of alternative 6 alone,
and group C of alternatives 7 through 9. According to the subtournament on group
A each alternative defeats 2 other alternaitives within this group and is defeated by 2
alteratives within this group. Similar results within group C, where each alternative
defeats and is defeated by one alternative. It remains to describe the wins between
22
alternatives of dierent groups. Here, a circular structure can be observed. Every
alternative of group A defeats alternative 6, alternative 6 defeats all alternatives of
group C, and every alternative of group C defeats all alternatives of group A.
The values attributed to the alternatives by  can be computed and shown to be equal
to 1
31
(18; 18; 18; 18; 18; 54; 45; 45; 45). Though alternative 6 defeats only 3 alternatives,
which is the least number of wins of the alternatives, it is the -winner16.
We observe a surprising result if we reverse all arcs in D. The digraph that represents
this situation will be denoted by D. Hence, alternative i defeats alternative j in D if
and only if alternative j defeats alternative i in D. The values of the alternatives ac-
cording to  in D are 1
101
(108; 108; 108; 108; 108; 180; 63; 63; 63). Note that alternative
6 is once more the -winner, i.e., reversing all results does not change the -winner in
this example.
Example 7.2 A social choice correspondence C satises Weak Condorcet consistency
on if for every pair of social choice situations (N;A; p); (M;A; q) with (x; y) 2 Dp for all
x 2 C(M;A; q) and y 2 Anfxg, it holds that C(M;A; q)\C(N[M;A; (p; q)) 6= ;, where
(p; q) is the union of the preference proles p and q on A (see Fishburn (1977)). The two
social choice correspondences discussed in this paper do not satisfy this property17 as
illustrated by the social choice situations (N;A; p) and (M;A; q) given by N = f1; 2g,
16This example also shows that C and C do not satisfy composition consistency as dened in
Laond, Laine and Laslier (1996).
17This example also shows that C and C do not satisfy the Exclusive and Inclusive Condorcet
Principles as considered in Fishburn (1977).
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M = f3a; 3b; 4a; 4b; 5a; 5b; 6a; 6b; 7a; 7b; 8a; 8bg, A = fx; y; a1; a2; a3; b1; b2; b3g ; and
preference proles p and q given by
p1 : x y a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3
p2 : x y b3 b2 b1 a3 a2 a1
q3 : a1 a2 a3 x b1 b2 b3 y
q4 : a3 a2 a1 x b3 b2 b1 y
q5 : y b1 b2 b3 a1 a2 a3 x
q6 : y x b3 b2 b1 a3 a2 a1
q7 : b1 a1 b2 a2 b3 a3 x y
q8 : x y b3 a3 b2 a2 b1 a1
where qi is the preference relation of both qia and qib; i 2 f3; : : : ; 8g. While (M;A; q)














with C(M;A; q) = C(M;A; q) = fxg and (x; z) 2 Dp for all z 2 A n fxg, the prole












































with C(N [M;A; (p; q)) = C(N [M;A; (p; q)) = fyg: 2
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